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Karl Polanyi wrote The Great Transformation in 1944 which analysed the double 
movement Europe experienced, from a situation where the market was heavily regulated 
and controlled in the eighteenth century to a virtually unregulated market in the 
nineteenth century, and the huge transformation in which the market was once more 
brought under control as a reaction to the poverty, unemployment and insecurity 
brought about by the unregulated market. Yet in both developed and developing 
countries there has since been a reaction with a new move towards the market. This 
paper analyses such processes in contemporary developing countries, and considers 
whether, in the light of the consequences of the unregulated market, a new Great 
Transformation is needed. It also considers whether such a transformation is likely, 
reviewing moves towards increased regulation of the market, and also the challenges 
faced by any contemporary great transformation arising from globalization and the 
nature of politics. 
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Undoubtedly, our age will be credited with having seen the end of the 
self-regulating market. (Polanyi 1944: 148) 
 
It appeared then [in 1995] that that the idea of an integrated world 
economy, founded on market relationships, had been reborn after a long 
collectivist hiatus. (Wolf 2005: xvii)  
1 Introduction 
In his path-breaking book The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of our Times,1 Polanyi analysed what he called the Great Transformation in 
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, he actually describes a ‘double 
movement’: one from the pre-market, pre-industrial system to the market-dominated 
industrialization of the nineteenth century. The second—which was what he termed the 
Great Transformation—consisted in the succession of changes that were provoked by 
the predominance of the market model. When he wrote the book, in 1944, it seemed that 
this second transformation was here to stay. Yet, there has been a huge resurgence of 
the market since the 1970s—many of the changes which Polanyi described have been 
rolled back, especially in developing countries. Indeed, in developing countries, it 
appears that the situation may be back to one resembling the pre-transformation 
situation of nineteenth century Europe. This paper considers the types of change 
documented by Polanyi for Europe in contemporary developing countries, and in the 
light of these explores, first whether a new Great Transformation is needed, and second 
whether, in a Polanyi style reaction to the market model, such a transformation is likely. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews Polanyi’s two-stage 
transformations in Europe; Section 3 considers whether these same transformations also 
occurred in developing countries and the ways in which Polanyi’s Great Transformation 
has been rolled back in developing countries, following a similar but smaller movement 
in this direction among the developed countries. Subsequently, in Section 4 we analyse 
first the desirability and then the likelihood of a new Great Transformation. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
Polanyi’s basic argument was that the market model involved such excesses and 
distortions that a reaction was inevitable. Is this still true today? And are the political 
processes similar to those of nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, or have changes 
in the nature of capitalism in general, and constraints imposed by globalization on 
developing countries, in particular, made an effective reaction (or a new Great 
Transformation) impossible?  
                                                 
1 All page references to Polanyi refer to the 1944 book.   2
2  Polanyi’s Great Transformation 
To understand the Great Transformation, or series of reactions to the pure market 
system reinstating regulation, one has first to explore the origins of this market system. 
While markets may exist in some form in most, if not all, societies, they frequently do 
so in a subordinate role which is not what Polanyi meant by a market economy. What 
Polanyi defines as a market economy is a self-regulating system ‘directed by market 
prices and nothing but market prices’ (Polanyi: 45). In such a fully fledged, self-
regulating market system ‘the control of the economic system by the market is of 
overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than 
the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded 
in social relations, social relations are embedded in the market’ (ibid.: 60). Markets 
dominate where (a) each individual is motivated primarily by economic gain for 
him/herself; and (b) there are no (or few) regulations preventing the free flow of 
resources to where gains are maximized. Polanyi argues that neither of these conditions 
obtained either historically or in pre-modernized societies,2 so that ‘Though the 
institution of the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age, its role was no 
more than incidental to economic life’ (ibid.: 45). 
 
Drawing on the famous anthropological works available to him (Mead, Lewis, 
Malinowski, Thurnwald) he claims that all anthropological research shows that 
economic (or maximizing) motives were subordinate to social relationships. ‘… man’s 
economy as a rule is submerged in his social relationships. He does not act so as to 
safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to 
safeguard his social standing, his social assets’ (ibid.: 48). In these societies, 
transactions were motivated by principles of reciprocity and of redistribution, while 
what he defined as householding, following Aristotle, (subsistence production in 
modern terms) provided the third principle of economic production. 
 
The subordinate role of private economic gains as a motive is one characteristic of non-
market economies. Another is the pervasive regulation of transactions, including land, 
labour, financial capital, and goods which obtained in pre-nineteenth century Europe, as 
well as elsewhere. Internal as well as external trade was subject to strict regulations, 
often administered by guilds. Tolls and prohibitions restricted trade between towns. 
Though many of these were abolished as a result of mercantilist pressures in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were replaced by extended government 
regulation. Equally, land was embedded in social relations and controlled politically and 
socially, rather than through the market (ibid.: 73). Labour was subject to numerous 
regulations and controls, including those governing the relations of master, journeyman 
                                                 
2 He quotes Aristotle as arguing that production for gain was not ‘natural to man’, although the fact that 
Aristotle found it necessary to state this suggests that production for gain was to some extent prevalent in 
his time.    3
and apprentice, by guild, custom and statute. Moreover, in England, the Act of 
Settlement of 1662 had imposed severe restrictions on labour mobility, since it gave to 
each parish the responsibility and duty to provide for their own destitutes. In general, 
‘The economic system was submerged in general social relations; markets were merely 
an accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated more than ever 
by social authority’ (ibid.: 70).  
 
The manifold regulations slowed down the growth of industry; and under pressure from 
the new entrepreneurial class, and with the support of economists, including Smith, 
Ricardo and Bentham, who argued that the self-regulating market would promote 
efficiency and growth, the main elements of regulation were abolished as the nineteenth 
century progressed. The restrictions on labour mobility were loosened in 1795, 
temporarily to be replaced by the unworkable Speenhamland system, (which essentially 
entitled every worker to a quite generous minimum income, irrespective of their work 
situation or earnings, discouraging work and imposing burdens on the rates). This was 
abolished in 1834 (by the reformed House of Commons which now included 
representatives of the emerging industrial entrepreneurial class), leaving only minimal 
and demeaning support for the destitute via workhouses. Combined with the 
Combination Laws of 1799 and 1800 which banned workers’ combinations, this marked 
the beginning of a competitive labour market.3 Restrictions on land transfers were 
likewise abolished.4 With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, the UK came close to a 
purely market economy. In Polanyi’s terms, labour, land and money had become 
‘fictitious’ commodities—fictitious because they were not produced in the same way as 
normal commodities and their price and use had implications way beyond that of the 
typical commodity, determining a family’s survival (in the case of wages), and 
environment and place, in the case of land.5 Yet, according to Bentham,6 in a view that 
is echoed by many advocating the introduction of ‘modern’ property rights reforms in 
developing countries, ‘The condition most favourable to the prosperity of agriculture 
exists when there are no entails, no inalienable endowments, no common lands, no 
rights or redemptions, no tithes’ (quoted in ibid.: 189). 
 
                                                 
3 Workers combinations developed, nonetheless, and the Act was repealed in 1824 in the belief that if 
legalized they would be less threatening. In fact, they burgeoned and in 1825 a new Combination Act was 
enacted which permitted trade unions to form but limited their right to strike (Briggs 1979: 212).  
4 By the Prescriptions Act, the Inheritance Act, the Fines and Recovery Act, the Real Property Act and 
the general Enclosures Act of 1801 as well as subsequent legislation.  
5 ‘The economic function is but one of many vital functions of land. It invests man’s life with stability; it 
is the site of his habituation; it is a condition of his physical safety; it is the landscape and the seasons’ 
(Polanyi 1944: 187). 
6  Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings (1952-54) critical edition based on his printed works and 
unprinted manuscripts, by W. Stark. Published for the Royal Economic Society, Allen & Unwin: London.   4
The social consequences of these reforms, in the short to medium term, were appalling 
in terms of poverty, squalor and indignities. Workers were forced to work very lengthy 
days in dangerous conditions; child labour abounded; and health, sanitation, and 
housing were all of abysmal standards.7 The business cycle saw sharp fluctuations in 
activity culminating in the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s. These extreme 
consequences led to reactions which limited market freedoms. Two types of reaction 
occurred: piecemeal reform in Britain and some other countries in Western Europe; and 
massive changes in the whole organization of society and the economy in the cases of 
Marxist and Fascist societies.  
 
In Britain, reforms emerged as a result of a combination of pressures: liberal observers 
campaigned to correct gross abuses—including Robert Owen who initiated the co-
operative movement; the Chartist movement which fought for political rights (without 
success in the short run); and the growth of the trade union movement. Factory acts 
followed which regulated hours and conditions and banned child labour. The extension 
of the franchise to the (male) urban skilled working-class in 1867, and then to skilled 
and semi-skilled agricultural labourers and miners in 1887, increased political pressure 
to improve working conditions. These reforms were soon followed by the expansion of 
education to much of the working-class and by further legislation regulating factory 
conditions. The twentieth century saw more social interventions (with Lloyd George’s 
reforms, including unemployment insurance and pensions), the end of the gold standard 
and the reintroduction of tariffs in reaction to the massive unemployment of the 1920s 
and 1930s. During the Second World War planning and controls basically replaced the 
market. Polanyi was writing at the peak of regulations over the market in the UK. 
However, state interventions in the economy continued over the subsequent thirty years 
or so: Keynesian interventions dominated macro policy, while a comprehensive welfare 
state was established, following the recommendations of the Beveridge Report. Other 
features which constrained the role of the market included a strong role for trade unions, 
national wage bargaining, industrial and agricultural subsidies, a large state sector, 
tariffs on imports and limitations on currency convertibility. This was the Great 
Transformation—from an almost unadulterated market system to a strongly controlled 
one (with an even greater transformation in this direction in the cases of fascism and 
socialism). At the time Polanyi was writing neither Keynesian macro policy, nor 
industrial nationalization, nor the comprehensive welfare state had been introduced. Yet 
all fit so well into his Great Transformation that they serve to strengthen the case he was 
making. According to Polanyi this Great Transformation was the inevitable 
consequence of adopting a pure market economy because of its harsh and unacceptable 
human an environmental consequences  
                                                 
7 Engels (1920) was among the first to record the conditions of the English working-class in detail. Later 
in the century Rowntree (1901) started his pioneering investigation into poverty. Among many more 
recent accounts see, for example, Thompson (1964) Brown (1990) Huck (1995).   5
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark 
utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without 
annihilating the human and natural substance of society…Inevitably, 
society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took 
impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, 
and thus endangered society in yet another way. (p. 3) 
 
In the last part of this quotation, Polanyi hints that the situation brought about by the 
Great Transformation may not be a stable one. And, as is now well recognized, the 
heavily regulated society Polanyi described lasted only about thirty years and was 
followed by a swing back towards a market economy. Regulations and interventions 
were at their peak in the 1940s in the UK, just when Polanyi was writing. But a ‘bonfire 
of controls’ soon followed, as wartime price controls and licensing were dismantled. In 
the subsequent decades, there was gradual liberalization, with lowered trade restrictions 
and a slow move towards convertible currency. However, the sharp policy reversal 
occurred in the Thatcherite era of the 1980s, in a political move to the right which was 
due in part to the way the previous interventionist system had, as noted by Polanyi in 
the above quotation, ‘disorganized industrial life and thus endangered society in yet 
another way’. Keynesian macro policies were generally discredited and disavowed in 
theory, though not always in practice. Britain led the way in privatizing previously 
nationalized industries and in limiting the powers of the trade unions. The private sector 
began to make headway even in the provision of public services. The market once again 
dominated society, albeit a much regulated market, constrained on most fronts by 
myriad regulations relating to employment conditions, market structure, trading 
conditions etc. Moreover, in most developed countries extensive measures of social 
protection were maintained.  
3  Polanyi and developing countries 
In so far as Polanyi himself considered what we now term ‘developing countries’ in his 
book on the Great Transformation he did so as the subject of study by anthropologists, 
pointing out, as already noted, that in these societies the market played a subordinate 
role only, and that neither land nor labour were treated as commodities, to be bought 
and sold on an unregulated market.8 Rather both had important social functions, and 
social relationships largely determined their allocation and use. According to Polanyi, 
exchange took place according to the principles of reciprocity and redistribution, the 
latter involving hierarchical and centralized modes. Since the developing countries 
provided just a backdrop in Polanyi’s book—a model with which to contrast European 
developments— what follows is my own attempt to describe developments in Polanyist 
terms. 
                                                 
8 He treated the topic more systematically in Polanyi (1957).   6
To summarize a hugely complex and differentiated situation, the colonial period saw a 
mixture of ‘traditional’ relationships outside the market, and forced markets, introduced 
by the colonists. The colonial period did not see the introduction of an extensive 
unregulated market to the extent that occurred in nineteenth century Europe because 
large swathes of most economies remained outside the market. Political independence 
(for most developing countries occurring between 1945 and 1970, though, of course, in 
Latin America it was much earlier) happened at a time when planning, public ownership 
and market regulation was dominant in Europe. This was also the era of apparently 
thriving socialism in the Soviet empire. The interventionist philosophy resonated with 
the objectives, politics and philosophy of the newly independent countries, and of Latin 
American governments, which had already started to initiate active industrial policies in 
reaction to the fall in commodity prices in the 1930s. 
 
For most post-colonial countries in the 1950s, the overriding reality was 
underdevelopment, characterized by low incomes, a predominantly agrarian structure 
with a large subsistence subsector, and heavy dependence on the industrialized countries 
for all modern inputs. Governments of the newly independent countries had two related 
economic objectives: to become economically as well as politically independent; and to 
raise their incomes to the levels of the developed countries. In a famous statement 
President Truman declared that  
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism is dead—
exploitation for foreign profit has no place in our plans. What we must 
envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of 
democratic fair dealing.9  
 
The desirability of development planning was widely accepted, by developed country 
observers10 as well as developing country theoreticians and practitioners. Development 
plans were introduced by Mahalanobis in India, Prebisch in Latin America and visiting 
economists in many African economies (Killick 1983). The state was given a major role 
in determining economic priorities via price and import controls, investment planning 
and sometimes as a producer, with the adoption of a strategy of import-substituting 
industrialization. Formal sector labour markets were subject to regulations, including 
minimum wages. And trade unions were recognized as important players. Thus 
developing countries virtually skipped Polanyi’s unregulated market phase, moving 
straight into a situation of extensive regulation and a large public sector, with markets, 
again, playing a subordinate role. 
                                                 
9 Inaugural Address, 20 January 1949, Washington DC. 
10 For example, Fei and Ranis, by no means anti-market economists, stated that ‘The need for 
development planning is well recognised’ (Fei and Ranis 1964: 199).   7
The policies adopted were in some ways remarkably successful. Savings and investment 
rates rose dramatically from the mid 1950s and growth accelerated in most countries, 
and some countries, notably in East Asia, experienced spectacular growth rates. Social 
indicators, such as infant mortality and literacy rates, also improved, although other 
developments were less welcome. Population growth accelerated, and growth in 
employment lagged behind output. Unemployment and underemployment emerged as 
serious problems; and the absolute numbers of people falling below the poverty line 
increased. A dualistic pattern of development continued, with a small relatively 
privileged modern sector leaving the rest of the economy with low incomes and 
investment.11 Moreover, the economic independence sought proved elusive, as 
dependence on developed countries for capital and technology increased.  
 
The situation changed in the early 1980s, following the abrupt switch to monetarism in 
Britain and the US. Interest rates rose and there was world recession, with a sharp 
worsening in commodity prices. Most developing countries—who had borrowed 
heavily in the 1970s to finance current account deficits resulting from oil price rises—
found themselves in an unsustainable financial position and were forced to request 
assistance from the international financial institutions (IFIs). These institutions used the 
opportunity to enforce a series of pro-market reforms on the borrowing countries (a 
package which came to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’). These reforms 
together led to a virtually complete retreat from interventionism and the institution of 
something approaching the ‘self-regulating market’.  
 
The following reforms were widely enacted:12 
•  conversion of quotas into tariffs and reduction of tariffs 
•  abolition of industrial licensing 
•  privatization 
•  reduced/eliminated restrictions on foreign ownership of assets and supplies of 
components 
•  reduction/abolition of minimum wage 
•  reduced role of trade unions 
•  move towards budget balance  
•  reduced ‘financial repression’ with abolition of directed credit and market 
determination of interest rates. 
                                                 
11 The ILO summarized the position, ‘It has become increasingly evident … that rapid growth at the 
national level does not automatically reduce poverty or inequality or provide sufficient productive 
employment (ILO 1976: 15). 
12 For evidence of the advance of these policies in Latin America and Africa see, for example, 
Williamson (1990); World Bank and UNDP (1989); Dean et al. (1994).   8
In many countries, in addition, there was: 
•  moves towards convertibility of currencies 
•  capital account liberalization 
•  an increased market role in the provision of government services 
•  the introduction of western style property rights with respect to land 
•  and similarly, with respect to intellectual property. 
 
The changes paralleled changes introduced in developed countries roughly at the same 
time, but far exceeded them as developed countries confronted much less harsh 
economic conditions, were not dependent on the IFIs and could therefore follow 
independent policies. Moreover, as democracies, they were unable to adopt policies 
against the interests of the majority, while some of the well established interest groups 
were extremely powerful. Thus, the US and EU retained agricultural subsidies that 
would not have been permitted by the IFIs in developing countries. The US has 
periodically run huge budget deficits, which, similarly would be unacceptable to the 
IFIs; in continental Europe the labour movement retains considerable power to regulate 
the labour market, resisting efforts to make it ‘more flexible’ and, despite privatization, 
the state continues to account for 40 per cent or more of most European economies. 
Most importantly, in Europe, the state continues to guarantee reasonable minimum 
standards of living and of public services for all citizens.  
 
In developing countries, the pro-market changes were more radical and systematic, 
albeit at uneven pace, varying with the degree of local autonomy. The large and 
powerful countries—China and India—were able to choose the pace and degree of 
liberalization, whereas small African countries generally had to take the medicine in one 
go, with Latin American countries in an intermediate position. Moreover, whereas in 
most developed countries the impact on livelihoods was cushioned by elaborate social 
security systems and the newly privatized industries were circumscribed by more or less 
effective regulation, in developing countries, social security systems were much more 
limited in scope and the regulatory system much more tenuous. However, while 
interventionism had been extensive in virtually all developing countries, it generally 
only directly affected a minority of the population—those in the so-called formal sector. 
The majority of the population in most developing countries were in unregulated or 
weakly regulated sectors, including those in the non-agricultural informal sector and 
most people working in agriculture. Social security systems, such as they were, also 
mostly only related to this relatively privileged minority, as did the trade unions. So the 
unravelling of interventions and reduced social security that went with the reforms for 
the most part only affected the minority in the formal sector directly, albeit the others 
were affected via knock-on affects, as, for example, the newly unemployed joined the 
informal sector, swelling numbers and depressing incomes. 
   9
Interpreting and analysing these changes in Polanyist-terms, we can see that in 
developing countries they might be best interpreted as being parallel to the move to the 
market in Europe in the nineteenth century, with the abolition of regulations being akin 
to the unravelling of the various guild and statutory regulations of pre-nineteenth 
century Europe, It was not so much, therefore, the reintroduction of a market for labour 
or land, or money, but the introduction of these markets in more-or-less pure form for 
the first time. And as in Europe in the nineteenth century, the changes were not 
accompanied by mechanisms to protect people from the harshest affects. Only after 
nearly a decade of tough reforms with evidence of sharply rising poverty levels, did the 
IFIs recommend some rather weak mechanisms to protect the poor in developing 
countries. In this there is a contrast with Europe of the late twentieth century, where 
existing protective mechanisms—although they did not prevent rising inequality—have 
prevented poverty rising in absolute terms.  
 
There are some other important differences in the developing country switch to the 
market from the changes in nineteenth century Europe. First, in Europe the changes 
reflected the ideas of major domestic philosophers and were introduced as a result of 
domestic pressures. In contrast, in contemporary developing countries, the ‘liberal’ pro-
market philosophy almost all came from outside; including Milton Friedman (US), Ian 
Little (UK), Maurice Scott (UK), Tibor Scitovsky (US), Bela Balassa (US), Anne 
Krueger (US), with Deepak Lal and Jagdish Bhagwati (from India, but educated in the 
UK) almost the sole developing country representatives of the initial push towards 
marketization. And while it was the emerging industrial classes who forced the pace of 
reform in the UK in the nineteenth century, it was the IFIs, themselves ruled by and 
largely representing the interests of the developed countries, which forced the pace in 
developing countries. In neither nineteenth century Europe, nor contemporary 
developing countries, were the changes introduced through democratic institutions. In 
Europe, they predated democracy, and were largely reversed once democratic 
institutions were instituted. The second pro-market transformation in Europe (in the late 
twentieth century) did occur in democracies, but this time, as noted, it was surrounded 
by regulations and social protection mechanisms. Most developing countries adopting 
pro-market changes were not democratic, as the extensive democratization of the 1990s 
mainly followed the reforms (and in part may have been a reaction to them). In any 
case, it was the IFIs—sometimes with the support of local elites—who initiated the 
changes, although some of the local elite undoubtedly benefited from some reforms, 
such as privatization. Few countries had any sort of democratic debate on the measures. 
Where there was debate (as in Nigeria in 1986), the proposed reforms were rejected. 
 
Another big difference from nineteenth century Europe was the importance of 
globalization in the late twentieth century, and particularly global corporations. In the 
nineteenth century, the UK, if not the rest of Europe, could largely ignore global forces   10
and determine its policy autonomously in what it considered to be its own best 
interests.13 This is not an option for developing countries today, whose high dependence 
on aid, trade, and overseas investment makes global considerations paramount. The 
huge influence of the IFIs has already been noted. But even countries which do not 
depend on them must consider the impact of their policies on trade and capital flows. In 
general, such global influences reinforced (and lay behind) the IFIs promotion of market 
mechanisms. The new global economy also makes a fundamental difference, as 
compared with Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in constraining the 
possibilities of a new Great Transformation, as we shall discuss below.  
 
A further difference arises from the nature of politics in developing countries; whereas 
politics in Europe historically tended to be class based—perhaps because of the relative 
homogeneity of populations—contemporary developing country politics tend to be 
patrimonial and/or political support and divisions follow ethnic or religious differences 
(Horowitz 1985; UNRISD 2005).  
3.1  Consequences of the switch to the market for developing countries14 
The pro-side argues, in brief, that growth accelerated, poverty declined, and inequality 
fell during the era of pro-market reforms and enhanced global integration. The anti-side 
argues that while growth accelerated in the two Asian giants (China and India) it has 
slowed down in Africa and Latin America; poverty numbers showed little fall and the 
Millennium Development Goals will not be met in large numbers of countries (UNDP 
2005). The pro-side argues that world income distribution has improved since 1980 
when country incomes are weighted by population (Boltho and Toniolo 1999). The anti-
side points to a worsening of inequality in the majority of countries and a widening in 
absolute gaps between the richest and poorest countries (Wolf 2004, chapter 9; Cornia 
2004). In addition, national instability and personal insecurity has risen with higher 
fluctuations in national incomes as capital swings in and out which is reflected in rising 
personal insecurity, particularly as social security systems are cutback. 
 
                                                 
13 It is often pointed out that globalization was high pre-First World War, fell after the war, and then 
resumed its upward growth. For example, foreign assets over GDP were estimated at 18.6 per cent in 
1900 falling to 4.9 per cent in 1945 and rising to 17.7 per cent in 1980. However, in 1870 it was only 6.9 
per cent and by 1995, the ratio had risen to 56.8 per cent, which supports the view that global forces were 
much more important towards the end of the twentieth century than in the mid nineteenth century (data 
from Crafts 2000). 
14 There is a huge literature on the consequences of marketization and globalization, with highly 
divergent opinions. This is reflected in the titles of recent works if we take globalization as broadly 
synonymous with pro-market reforms. On the one hand, Martin Wolf (2004) has written Why 
Globalization Works, described by The Economist as ‘the definitive treatment of the subject’, while 
Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) has written a very similar book entitled In Defence of Globalization. In contrast, 
Joe Stiglitz’s (2002) book on the same subject is entitled Globalization and its Discontents, while George 
Soros (himself a major actor in advancing globalization) has produced a book entitled The Crisis of 
Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered (1998).   11
There were huge differences in impact in different parts of the world which are not 
reflected in these aggregates. Out of 104 low and middle HDI countries, the majority 
(64) had per capita growth rates of less than 1 per cent from 1975-2002, and 41 had 
falling per capita incomes (UNDP 2005). For the most part, the performance in Africa 
was extremely weak on all fronts. In Latin America, growth was virtually non-existent 
over a twenty year period and inequality and poverty rose. Yet in most of Asia, and 
notably India and China, there was a marked acceleration in growth, and, despite rising 
inequality, poverty ratios and (more controversially) numbers fell. But the anti-
globalization team would argue that India and China controlled the market and did not 
accept it in pure form—hence their success. And the pro-team argue that if only it had 
been accepted in pure form everywhere, the results would be even better. ‘The world 
needs more globalization, not less’ (Wolf 2004: 320), echoing the arguments of some 
observers of nineteenth century Europe.15 
 
Yet, everywhere it is agreed that there remains unacceptable poverty. And while the 
market provides employment, incomes and private health and education for some, in 
virtually all developing countries it leaves out many more. In most places, the market is 
virtually unregulated, and conditions of work frequently parallel those of nineteenth 
century Europe, with long hours, unhealthy and unsafe conditions, employment of 
children and young women, crowded and unsanitary housing and pitiful wages. 
Moreover, the global attack on trade unions has weakened workers’ ability to protect 
themselves and downward pressure on government expenditure has weakened 
governments’ ability to do so. 
 
The devastating environmental consequences of current patterns of growth seems to be 
difficult to question (Figure 1). In the nineteenth century there were local environmental 
consequences not dissimilar to those experienced by developing counties today, but the 
global hazards—particularly that of global warming as a result of CO2 emissions—is 
unprecedented.16 This, as well as local environmental problems, is another consequence 
of an unregulated market world economy. Even the most enthusiastic globalizers argue 
that ‘the management of the environment requires well targeted measures (Wolf 2004: 
194). 
 
                                                 
15 ‘Liberal writers like Spencer (1940), Sumner (1963), Mises (1978), and Lippmann (1938), offer an 
account of the double movement substantially similar to our own, but they put an entirely different 
interpretation on it. In their view all protectionism was a mistake due to impatience, greed and short-
sightedness, but for which the market would have resolved its difficulties’ (Polany 1944: 148, italics 
added).  
16 These too were predicted by Polanyi (1944: 193) who argued that the consequences of the unregulated 
market might extend to ‘even the climate of the country which might suffer from the denudation of 
forests, from erosions and dust bowls, all of which ultimately depend on the factor land, yet none of 
which respond to the supply and demand mechanism of the market’.    12


















Source: Butler (2000). 
Note: 100 per cent represents level before any significant human impact. 
 
Apart from the magnitude of the environmental threat, the balance is not dissimilar from 
assessments of the market in the nineteenth century. There too a comparison with the 
previous situation was by no means ambiguously negative—growth had occurred at an 
unprecedented rate; some had gained significantly; and over the long run there was the 
prospect of an escape from the harsh conditions. But the downside was large, hence the 
reactions and the Great Transformation. In today’s developing world much the same can 
be said: so do we need, and can we expect, a new Great Transformation? 
4  The need for a new Great Transformation 
The basic characteristic of the first Great Transformation was to pull back control over 
people’s lives from being solely the product of impersonal market forces to being in 
society’s care, so that the market might serve society rather than society be subservient 
to the market. In order to achieve this political and organizational changes were 
necessary—basically an organized working-class and democratic reforms. The measures 
taken included those directed at improving working conditions, regulating firms, 
assuming power over macroeconomic policy, extending social protection and social 
services, and reintroducing restrictions on international trade. Any new Great 
Transformation would not necessarily include all the same elements—indeed it would 
be surprising if exactly the same ones were relevant today. But it would be based on the 
same objective; to make the market serve society rather than conversely, and it would 
be directed at ‘the protection of man, nature and productive organization … to 
rehabilitate the lives of men and their environment’ (Polanyi: 225). In view of the 
insecure and impoverished lives that so many live in developing countries today, and 
the severe damage to the environment that the current system is producing, it seems   13
difficult to argue against the objective of securing changes in such a direction. Indeed, 
given the global nature of the market today, the need for such a transformation would 
appear even greater than in the nineteenth century, since it is a matter not only of the 
disempowerment of all those (the vast majority) with few or no assets, but also the 
disempowerment of whole countries and even continents.  
 
While, as noted, actual measures most appropriate to achieving this fundamental 
objective are likely to differ from some of those in the earlier period and, indeed, 
between regions or countries, some (broadly defined) are likely to be shared across time 
and space. Each country needs to decide for itself what changes are needed—indeed this 
is part of having the market serve society. But common characteristics are likely to be: 
•  Regulation of conditions of work, not only in the formal sector but in the economy 
as a whole. 
•  Reasonable minimal income guarantees for all—to be determined, of course, in 
the light of the resource availability of the particular country. Where this does not 
permit a survival standard, aid resources may be called upon. 
•  Assurance of universal provision of basic social services.  
•  Regulation of the market to avoid monopolistic (or other) exploitation. 
•  Regulation of the economy to ensure environmental protection. 
•  Regulation of capital markets and of fiscal and monetary policy to avoid excess 
fluctuations in activity. 
 
4.1  Is a new Great Transformation under way? 
The original Great Transformation occurred through myriad activities in response to the 
harsh conditions of the market 
The purpose of the intervention was to rehabilitate the lives of men and 
their environment, to give them some security of status, intervention 
necessarily aimed at reducing the flexibility of wages and the mobility of 
labour, giving stability to incomes, continuity to production, introducing 
public control of natural resources and the management of currencies in 
order to avoid the unsettling changes in the price level. (Polanyi: 225) 
 
Among the forces supporting interventions of this kind, the most important in the UK 
were the emergence of the trade union movement together with the extension of the 
franchise and the political changes that followed, as well as changes in the intellectual 
climate (epitomised by Keynesian economics); elsewhere the communist and fascist 
revolutions were responses to these self-same harsh conditions. Above all, the changes 
followed because people combined to bring about changes that would control or even 
replace the market. As de Tocqueville (1966: 666) wrote, ‘In democratic countries   14
knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all forms of knowledge; on its progress 
depends that of all others’. The question then is whether we can expect, or indeed can 
already detect, similar changes in developing countries. There are some signs that 
indeed we can, but also evidence of severe constraints on their potential effectiveness.  
 
Democratization has made considerable progress among developing countries over 
recent decades. Between 1974 and 1999 multiparty electoral systems were introduced in 
113 countries (UNDP 2000: 38). This provides a permissive environment for 
transformation, particularly since the numerical majority have below average incomes, 
and are disproportionately lacking in social protection. However, whether this translates 
into extensive social change and market regulation depends on the nature of democracy 
and, particularly, political parties. In many countries, political parties are not ideological 
but organized behind personalities, family, ethnicity or religion, and use these ties 
together with patronage and corrupt practices to gain or retain power. But populist 
leaders have emerged with democratic transition and have tried to introduce some 
transforming policies. Examples include Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Lula da Silva 
in Brazil, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and Evo Morales in Bolivia. In principle, one 
would expect democracy in poor countries eventually to generate transforming policies. 
Indeed, there is some econometric evidence that democratic regimes are more 
redistributive than non-democratic (Silva Leander 2005). But there are some important 
constraints on governments in developing countries, including countries with 
democratic systems, which will be discussed later.  
 
A second force making for transformation is the growth of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and community organizations, both international and national. 
There has been a rapid growth in their numbers over recent decades (Salamon and 
Anheier 1999). In India, at least one million non-profit organizations have been counted 
(Sen 1998); in Brazil, federal government records include over 200,000 (Salamon and 
Anheier 1999); in Thailand, 15,000 were recorded by one observer (Pongsapich 1998). 
Of course, the category includes very different types of organization. Many are 
‘efficiency’ type groups,17 basically providing services where the market fails and 
complementing rather than challenging the market. But these may soften its harshest 
impacts. Others are ‘pro bono’ groups, delivering goods and services to the most 
impoverished, again supporting but also softening the market. The third category are 
groups with ‘claims’ functions; these aim to improve the position of their members by 
challenging rules and regulations and demanding greater shares of output. This third 
group includes, for example, associations of landless, worker associations of various 
types and also advocacy groups formed to alter regulations in ways which favour the 
deprived. In practice, many groups have more than one of these three functions. Where 
formed among or for the deprived, all three types of group tend to improve the social 
                                                 
17 This is the categorization adopted by Heyer et al. (2002).   15
and economic operation of the market but only the third type fully contributes to a Great 
Transformation, in the sense of being directed at changing the rules. 
 
A survey of local organizations in the early 1980s found about two-thirds were 
primarily devoted to production/efficiency issues, and one third to advancing group 
interests (Esman and Uphoff 1984).18 NGOs receiving government or international 
support tend to be entirely in the first two categories (production and/or pro bono).19 
NGOs undoubtedly do contribute to a transformation, but generally their impact is 
limited for various reasons. One reason is that their total coverage is mostly quite 
limited.20 Moreover, in general, the poor are particularly handicapped in forming such 
groups because of lack of education, finance, and networks (Thorp et al. 2005), and 
many of the NGOs purportedly intended to assist the poor, in practice do not, either 
because their real agendas are rather different or because they are ineffective. Thus a 
study of NGOs in Africa argues that local NGOs lack effective power: ‘this absence of 
NGO power has undermined development across the continent’ (Michael 2004: 105). 
Moreover, new models of organization (the ‘New Public Administration’)21 have been 
imposed on many local NGOs organization (in the name of transparency, accountability 
and efficiency) which have tended to undermine their effectiveness in reaching the poor 
(Lorgen 2002; Mawdsley et al. 2002).  
 
A more general critique of the role of NGOs as a mechanism for challenging dominant 
power structures is the Marxist/Gramsci view that what civil society organizations 
essentially do is to support the hegemonic power—they may challenge aspects of this 
power. ‘But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot 
touch the essential’ (Gramsci 1971: 161). ‘In this paradigm, civil society is understood 
as the arena in which the state perpetuates its power through hegemonic rather than 
coercive means’ (Brown 2004: 20; see also Femia 2001). In general, NGOs do not 
attack the fundamental causes of poverty (land distribution, technology, terms of trade). 
For example, a review of NGOs in Egypt concluded that 
The mission of the majority of Egyptian NGOs is not to alter the 
structural inequalities in society, but rather to attempt to ‘alleviate’ the 
suffering of the poor and render their lives more bearable. By doing so, 
NGOs are actually postponing any real lasting solutions to deeply 
                                                 
18 Pro bono type organizations were not included. 
19 See, for example, the activities recorded in a survey of NGOs in Uganda; Barr et al. (2005). 
20 There are a few well known exceptions; for example total micro credit provision in Bangladesh is 
estimated to extend to over 13 million people; the health and nutrition programmes of BRAC in 
Bangladesh are estimated to cover over 30 million people. But even these appear to have a rather small 
impact on poverty, as indicated by the so-called macro-micro paradox of Bangladesh—that despite such 
extensive and effective NGOs, poverty remains high (White 1992). 
21 See Greenwood et al. (2002); Frederickson (1980).   16
embedded problems of the poor and exploited in society. (Abdelrahman 
2004: 196-7) 
 
The spectacular growth of international NGOs (INGOs),22 sometimes known as ‘global 
civil society’ (GSC), may also challenge the model of market dominance at a global 
level. A breakdown of GSC according to their function, however, shows that INGOs 
devoted to ‘economic development and infrastructure’ (efficiency functions as defined 
above) account for the largest number (around 9,500), followed by ‘research’ at over 
8,000 (presumably leading to advocacy), then social services, health and education also 
around 8,000 (which would be classified as efficiency and pro bono) with ‘politics’ at a 
little over 1,000 and showing a small decline, 1990-2000. Like NGOs, the total impact 
of INGOs is limited. For example, they initiated the growing fair trade movement but it 
still accounts for only a very small fraction of total trade; just 2 per cent of the coffee 
market in 2002 (and this is an industry where it has probably made most progress). The 
total value of fair trade was estimated at GB£500 million; only 0.03 per cent of 2002 
value of developing country merchandise exports.23 
 
INGO advocacy is directed at global rules and may contribute to a transformation at this 
level.24 INGO campaigns can take credit for the introduction of the developing country 
debt relief (HIPC), which has alleviated some of the financial problems of the poorest 
countries, but in no way contributed to structural transformation as can be seen by the 
content of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) with which HIPC is 
associated, to be discussed further below.  
 
Another international source of transformation is the growing movement for corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Campaigns in the North have put pressure on multinational 
companies to operate in a ‘responsible’ way. Responsibility is interpreted as not using 
child labour, providing reasonable conditions for workers, sometimes including 
provision of social services for workers and for the locality where the companies 
operate, and being environmentally responsible.25 Schemes include company codes of 
conduct, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and public-private partnerships. These have 
changed the operations of particular companies, but the impact is spotty, typically 
confined to particular companies operations and not to the economy at large. They often 
sideline trade unions and do not extend to the informal sector. Some companies clearly 
                                                 
22 Kaldor et al. (2004).  
23 Estimate from D. Carvajal, ‘Third world gets help to help itself’, International Herald Tribune, 
7 December 2005. 
24 For example Oxfam’s trade reports. Jubilee 2000’s campaign for debt relief.  
25 The movement has generated ‘codes of conduct, improvements in occupational health and safety, 
environmental management systems, social and environmental reporting, support for community projects 
and philanthropy’ (Utting 2004: 1); see also IDS (2005).   17
use SCR for public relations, while continuing with deleterious activities (for example, 
British American Tobacco, see ASH 2002). As Utting (2004: 1) notes, ‘There is a 
danger … of codes as being seen as something more than they really are, and being used 
to deflect criticism, reduce the demand for external regulation and undermine the 
position of trade unions.’ Nevertheless, among foreign companies, some participation in 
SCR has become fairly extensive. Multi-stakeholder initiatives of various kinds were 
estimated to cover about 53,000 companies in 2004, of which over 90 per cent mostly 
related to certification schemes. The estimated number of TNCs plus affiliates in 2002 
was 934,000 (data from Utting 2004). Only about 4,000 TNCs produce reports on their 
social or environmental performance (IDS 2005). Public-private partnerships have also 
been growing, encouraged at a global level by the United Nations. However, regulation 
seems to be weak: ‘the lack of attention to criteria and procedures for selecting and 
screening corporate partners, and to monitoring and compliance mechanisms, are 
downsides to the rapid proliferation of PPPs’ (Utting 2004: 2). These initiatives are 
mostly fairly recent. With a strong input into monitoring from communities and NGOs 
and the development of government regulatory mechanisms, including the development 
of appropriate standards for the whole economy and mechanisms for monitoring and 
complaints and penalties, SRC could make a contribution to a new transformation, 
albeit confined to the sectors controlled by multinational corporations. 
 
Taken together these non-governmental organizations, national and international, do 
make a contribution but a limited one, largely because that is the nature of voluntary 
non-governmental activity. Their ambiguous impact—partly carrying out official policy 
and partly challenging it—again reflects the ambiguity in Gramsci’s who, while seeing 
them as largely instrumentalized by prevailing powers also saw them as a source of 
dissent: civil society is ‘the space where the subaltern classes can challenge the power 
of the state’ (Abdelrahman 2004: 22). In line with this ambiguity, such organizations 
may achieve a minor transformation, but not a great one.  
 
In the North, the Great Transformation essentially occurred as a result of government, 
not non-governmental action, even though NGO pressure was highly influential over 
government action. There is a parallel with nineteenth century Britain: Owen’s 
Lanarkshire experiment (a ‘socially responsible’ factory) and the co-operative 
movement he supported did make a contribution, as did the Workers’ Education 
Associations and many charitable institutions which dispensed support for the poor of 
various kinds, but the Great Transformation had to await government action. While 
there was a paternalistic element to some action by leaders such as Disraeli, appalled at 
the condition of the poor, most reforms were due to political pressures coming from 
political parties and their supporters. Hence we need to return to the question of how 
much we can expect to come from this source in contemporary developing countries.    18
4.2  Constraints on a New Great Transformation 
In countries where the market is basically succeeding, in the sense that it is generating 
relatively stable growth and expansion of employment and incomes, political parties 
may be expected broadly to support the extension of the market, intervening only at the 
edges. But in countries where the market seems be failing, associated with high and 
sometimes rising levels of poverty and stagnant and sometimes falling incomes, one 
would expect a more robust political challenge. This seems particularly probable where 
there are democratic institutions—the situation, as noted, in most developing countries 
today. Yet everywhere the political and economic situation seems to constrain any 
political challenge to the market to a much greater extent than it did in Europe and the 
USA in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Moreover, the way politics is 
organized in most developing countries also militates against radical change. 
Constraints arise from the growth of the multinational corporation and other global 
institutions, as well as the increasing importance of the global economy for most 
developing countries, which together severely limit countries’ freedom of action.  
 
It is often pointed out that globalization is not a new phenomenon, but was equally in 
evidence pre-1914 (Hirst 1997). However, a major difference today is the presence of 
MNCs and multinational institutions which present more severe constraints to 
independent and market challenging action than was the case in Europe when the Great 
Transformation occurred. The constraints are partly external and economic, partly 
internal and political. 
 
First, there are multinational institutions—the IFIs and the WTO in particular—whose 
rules and influence all promote pro-market policies. Their impact on developing country 
policy is extensive. Policy-based lending represents 10-20 per cent of total World Bank 
lending and one third of commitments. In one way or other adjustment conditions affect 
virtually every borrowing country—that is, almost every developing country. About half 
the conditions (1999-2004) involve a strong pro-market component (those relating to 
trade, economic management, agriculture and infrastructure and finance and the private 
sector), while the rest relate to the social sector and infrastructure and public sector 
management (also often involving market reforms). In the 1980s, the conditions 
involving direct market elements accounted for a substantially higher proportion (at 70 
per cent) (data from World Bank 2005).  
 
The IMF’s traditional focus is on macroeconomic stabilization, but what they term 
‘structural’ conditions have become of increasing importance. These are 
‘comprehensive programs that include policies of the scope and character required to 
correct structural imbalances in production, trade and prices’.26 Structural policies cover 
                                                 
26 Decision of the executive board in 1974 when establishing the extended fund facility (EFF) quoted by 
IMF (2001: 3).   19
a wide range of reforms relating to tariffs and pricing policy, subsidies, privatization, as 
well as some institutional reforms. The thrust of the reforms, like those of the 
adjustment lending of the World Bank, is towards a greater role for the market 
(although not every one could be classified in this way—some involve improving 
administration, for example). By the mid 1990s almost all arrangements had some 
structural arrangements, while the number of structural conditions per arrangement also 
grew (IMF 2001: 9). Conditions relate predominantly to the exchange system, the trade 
regime, pricing and marketing, public enterprise reform, privatization (accounting for 
the largest proportion of conditions), and the financial sector (IMF 2001: 24). While 
World Bank lending is virtually universal, IMF conditions only come into play among 
countries which have a financial crisis and need IMF support. Hence the conditions 
have been mainly felt in Africa, Latin America and the transition countries. However, 
after the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 structural conditionality extended to East 
Asian countries. In Indonesia this involved reforms across the board; in Korea, reforms 
were mainly in relation to the financial sector and some ‘systemic reforms’; and in 
Thailand the reforms extended to privatization, the financial sector and ‘systemic 
reforms’. 
 
Despite claims that the IFIs wish to promote country ‘ownership’, no country wishing to 
receive support from the international institutions can undertake any major challenges to 
the market organization of their economies—indeed, quite the reverse, as there is a 
continual push for a greater role for the market. While the desirability of tackling 
poverty is universally accepted, actual policies to achieve this are severely constrained 
by this market context, together with requirements for budget balance. The PRSPs are a 
good example of this. They are the main mechanism by which the World Bank, IMF 
and donor community have been promoting poverty reduction and engineering country 
‘ownership’ of programmes: yet they all accept orthodox pro-market macro and meso 
policies, making only minor changes in resource allocation at the local level (Table 1). 
 
The WTO is another global institution devoted to promoting free market resource 
allocations—though with notable exceptions. Trade reforms are all towards freer trade, 
even though progress in areas of particular interest to developing countries, especially 
agriculture, is slow. However, the WTO does not cover the movement of labour, and 
many countries are increasing restrictions on international labour mobility, particularly 
in relation to unskilled labour. In so far as the WTO supports and extends intellectual 
property rights, this too goes against free trade and resource allocational efficiency since 
it prices a commodity far in excess of its marginal cost.  
 
Multinational corporations are the other global institutions which constrain moves 
towards a transformation. They do so partly by putting pressure on democratic 
institutions, through lobbying, finance of political parties, and corrupt practices, and 
partly by threatening to remove their investments if a country introduces policies which 
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Reliance  on  macroeconomic  stability  for  poverty  reduction  x x x x x x x X x x x x x 
Trade policy (tariff reduction/export promotion)  x   x x x x     x x   x x 
Monetary restraint  x  x  x x   x   X x x x x x 
Exchange  rate  policy  x x x x     x X x x   x x 
Fiscal  restraint  x x x x x   x X x x x x x 
Tax  and  customs  reforms  x x   x x x x   x x   x x 
Price  control/wage  policies  x  x           x   
User  fees   x     x     x   x  x 
Sectoral  policies  x x x   x x x x x       x 
Financial sector reform 
Financial institutions  x  x x     x x x x x   x x 
Financial  intermediation  policies  x x         x x x x   x x 
Private sector development 
Privatization  x x x   x x x   x x   x x 
Price  liberalization  x  x      x        
Legal  and  judicial  reform  x   x x x x x x x   x x x 



































































































































Reliance on macroeconomic stability for poverty reduction x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Trade policy (tariff reduction/export promotion)    x    x x  x  x x  x  x    x  x 
Monetary restraint  x  x  x  x  x  x   x x x x x x x 
Exchange  rate  policy      x  x          x x x x x x 
Fiscal  restraint  x  x    x  x  x x    x x x x x x 
Tax and customs reforms  x  x  x  x  x  x    x  x  x    x  x  x 
Price  control/wage  policies        x           x   
User  fees     x     x     x  x      x   
Sectoral  policies  x  x x x    x x  x  x      x  x  x 
Financial sector reform 
Financial institutions    x  x      x x  x x x   x x  
Financial  intermediation  policies    x  x  x    x x  x x x x x x  
Private  sector  development                      
Privatization    x  x  x  x  x x  x x x x   x x 
Price  liberalization    x             x     x 
Legal  and  judicial  reform  x  x  x  x  x  x x  x x x x x x x 
Land  tenure  laws  x    x  x  x  x x  x x x x x   x 
Source and note: 
a The reforms also include public sector governance and management and social sector 
reforms, but these are not detailed here for space reasons. The full table is in Stewart and Wang (2005: 
447-74). 
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might be costly for them. Crouch (2000: 2)  has analysed what he terms ‘post-
democracy’ in developed countries, which is a system in which political outcomes stem 
from business pressures 
Under this model, while elections certainly exist and can change 
governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle,   
managed by rival teams of professionals expert in the techniques of 
persuasion, and considering a small range of issue selected by those 
teams. The mass of citizens plays a passive quiescent, even apathetic 
part, responding only to the signals given them. Behind this spectacle of 
the electoral game politics is really shaped by private interaction between 
elected governments and elites which overwhelmingly represent business 
interests.  
 
Crouch (2000: 15-16) argues that the globalization of business interests (together with 
the fragmentation of the working population) shifts political advantage away from those 
‘seeking to reduce inequalities of wealth and power in favour of those wishing to return 
them to levels of the pre-democratic past’.27 And as a consequence 
The welfare state is gradually becoming residualised as something for the 
deserving poor rather than a range of universal rights of citizenship; trade 
unions exist on the margins of society; the role of the state as policeman 
and incarcerator returns to prominence; the wealth gap between rich and 
poor grows; taxation becomes less redistributive. 
 
Confronted by such powerful forces, can we expect the fragile new democracies of 
developing countries to do better? Will they move straight from pre-democracy to post-
democracy, bypassing what Crouch calls ‘the democratic moment’? Crouch points to 
the fragmentation of social classes in contemporary developed countries which prevents 
unity of interests, such as obtained among the working-class in Europe at earlier 
times.28 Such fragmentation is also in evidence in developing countries—the interests 
                                                 
27 Similar arguments are advanced by Foot (2005) who goes further than Crouch, stating that ‘The 
system of society favoured by the rich across the world, capitalism, is in its essence and in its daily 
dealing with human beings wholly hostile to democracy. In all its manifestations it is hierarchical and 
bureaucratic’ (p. 428). ‘Capitalism and democracy are always in conflict and the history of all capitalist 
states that have conceded universal suffrage has been, in part, a history of that conflict’ (p. 429). See also 
Brittan (1975), who identified a clash between market capitalism and liberal democracy and predicted the 
victory of the former over the latter . 
28 ‘Nevertheless, when every caution has been made, the outstanding fact of the period between 1790 and 
1830 is the formation of the “working-class”. This is revealed, first in the growth of class conscuiousness: 
the consciousness of an identity of interests as between all these diverse groups of working people and as 
against the interests of all oter classes. And second in the growth of corresponding forms of political and 
industrial organization. By 1932 there were strongly based and self-conscious working-class 
institutions—trade uinions, friendly societies, educational and religious movements, political 
organizations, periodicals—working-class intellectual traditions, working-class community patterns, and 
a working-class structure of feeling’ (Thompson 1964: 168, 212-3). 
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of the agricultural sector generally differ from that of the industrial or services sectors; 
the landless from small and large landowners; unskilled industrial workers from skilled, 
professional and managerial workers; and women from men. This fragmentation is 
similar to that of Europe in the early industrial revolution and may explain the weakness 
of political parties representing working-classes and progressive ideas. Moreover, it is 
overlaid, in a way that was much less true of Europe in the nineteenth century, by ethnic 
and religious divisions. Indeed, Horowitz (1985) has argued that in the many ethnically 
(or religiously) divided societies, political parties tend to mobilize along ethnic rather 
than class lines. Research at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and 
Ethnicy (CRISE) has confirmed the strong ethnic/religious dimensions to politics in the 
countries studied and the weak element of ideological class-based politics. 29 
 
Yet, as industrialization proceeds, we may expect a more homogeneous working-class 
population to emerge in many countries—as an increasing proportion of the working 
population are employed in the formal non-agricultural sector. More ideological and 
class-based political parties (and governments) may develop as institutions evolve that 
represent, argue for, and unite such interests. Such institutions would not develop from 
NGOs, nor INGOs, even of an advocacy variety, nor social movements, because these 
tend to be single issue organizations and to divide rather than unite different groups. In 
developed countries, the growth of trade unions spearheaded such a movement (and 
were largely responsible for the Great Transformation). In contemporary developing 
countries, however, trade unions tend to be weak and divided, co-opted by governments 
and covering only a minority of workers, undermined wherever possible by the IFIs, 
MNCs and the elite,30 and lacking leadership because the most intelligent and 
entrepreneurial people mostly move up the educational ladder and away from working-
class occupations. Twentyfirst century technology requires a greater variety of skills and 
generates high and growing wage differentials between the skilled and unskilled which 
also reduces the unity of purpose of employees. To the extent that ‘post-Fordism’ 
prevails, it lends itself to post-democracy. 
 
Nonetheless, there are some signs that workers are acquiring some power in the more 
developed developing countries; that political parties are becoming more ideological; 
and that where the progressive parties do gain political power, moves occur in the 
direction of a transformation—South Korea and Brazil are examples. But where 
governments broadly representing alternative perspectives do emerge, their 
                                                                                                                                               
 29 See for example Akindes (2006); Brown (2005); Caumartin (2006).  
30 For example, in the early 1990s the Malaysian government indicated that it would not allow the 
unionization of the electronics sector because it would frighten foreign investors (since then, in-house 
unions have been allowed but still no sector-wide union); Brown (2004); cites Business Times, 
4 September 1992 ‘Some investors against nationwide union’.   23
achievements are heavily circumscribed by the international context; as can be seen in 
the developments in these two countries, and elsewhere, for example, in India, South 
Africa, and Venezuela. Like developed countries today, the transformatory 
achievements of such governments seem likely to be somewhat marginal—a small 
transformation, not a great one. Moreover, the tragedy is that alternative politics only 
seem to gain ground at late stages of development (as in Europe) and not in the poorer 
countries when the economy’s operations are most harsh and such a change is most 
needed. 
 
Devastating events can be another source of transformation. In Europe it was the Great 
Depression and the Second World War. Today environmental disasters most likely 
eventually force a pullback. The environmental shortcomings of the unregulated market 
(already pointed to by Polanyi) in time will affect the world’s elite as well as the poor 
and may therefore eventually—probably too late to offset the worst consequences of 
global warming—be a trigger for major transformatory action.  
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored whether Polanyi’s arguments—put forward in 1944 with 
respect to Europe—apply to contemporary developing countries. Polanyi showed how 
the harsh consequences of the unregulated market led to a counter-movement (a Great 
Transformation) to regulate and humanize the market, so that society controlled the 
market rather than vice-versa. This control over the market lasted about forty years, but 
then a counter-revolution set in, once more giving a central role to the market 
throughout the world and again leading to inequality and insecurity, along with 
accelerated growth in some places but stagnation in others. This reflected the ‘double 
movement’ that Polanyi analysed—the swing of the pendulum that occurs as the 
adverse consequences of movement in one direction lead to political reaction and 
consequently a reversal of the previous position. In developed countries, the renewed 
role for the market was accompanied by quite effective regulation and measures of 
social protection, but this has not been the case in most developing countries. In 
developing countries especially, therefore, the harsh consequences of the market make a 
new great transformation desirable, but the possibilities of change are severely 
constrained by global forces, especially international institutions that were not present in 
the first Great Transformation—the IFIs, the WTO and the huge powers of MNCs—
which pose severe constraints even on democratic politics. For developed and 
developing countries alike, the environmental consequences of the global market 
necessitate a major turn around. Yet here too, powerful business interests are preventing 
any serious change. 
 
This chapter has covered a huge amount of ground rather superficially. Hence it 
represents a research agenda, rather than a finished product. Certain areas seem 
particularly in need of further research:   24
•  What is the strength of movements for political change in particular countries 
around the world? 
•  Are the trade unions as weak as depicted here? And ideological parties broadly 
absent? 
•  Are there cases, where the majority workers in the informal and agricultural sector 
have succeeded in uniting and advancing their interests by so doing? 
•  How extensive and effective is the impact of the various SCR initiatives? 
•  Can single issue movements achieve major change? 
•  Can institutions for change be strengthened by international unity? 
•  Have some countries managed to break the constraints apparently imposed by the 
global institutions and the global economy, and secure changes towards a 
transformation? 
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